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Once this line of objection has been disposed with, the way is clear to develop in more detail a type-creationist account of repeatable artworks.
In order to evaluate the objections we need to know a little more about type-creationism. To start with the type side of things, the distinction between a type and its tokens is a metaphysical distinction between a general sort of thing and its particular instances. As such, types are universals. To illustrate: we need to distinguish between type and token words to answer the question 'how many words are there in this essay?' In the case of words, the type/token distinction is the distinction between dateable inscriptions and utterances (tokens), and the things inscribed or uttered (types). To see this, note that you and I can write the same word by writing different inscriptions; that is, we can write the same word type by writing distinct word tokens of that type. Now just as the type/token distinction is useful in linguistics, it also has utility in many other areas. 1 In particular, it is extremely plausible to think of repeatable works of art, as types, of which their particular copies and performances are tokens. First, employing the type/token distinction explains the repeatability of such artworks: a single work can be performed multiple times because the performances are tokens of the work, in just the same way that a sentence can be uttered on multiple occasions. Relatedly, you and I can listen to the same piece of music by listening to distinct recordings or performances of that piece. And again this mirrors what we want to say about word types and tokens. Moreover, it seems like we need to distinguish between types and tokens to account for the distinct readings of 'how many novels are there on your shelf?' and 'this is my favourite book'. So the type/token distinction seems tailor-made to account for the duality between work and performance/copy, and this has led many theorists to adopt this view. These two seemingly obvious thoughts are rarely put together, however, and are often seen as antithetical. But if we do combine them, then we have it that repeatable artworks are created types, just as we ordinarily take words to be -it seems that Shakespeare created the word 'besmirch', for example. This conception of repeatable artworks as created types is inspired by Strawson, Wollheim, and Levinson. For example, Strawson extends the notion of a type from languages to repeatable 'works of art, such as musical and literary compositions'. 6 And Wollheim notes that we postulate such types when 'we can correlate a class of particulars with a piece of human invention'. 7 Strawson and Wollheim's comments fit naturally with type-creationism about repeatable artworks, and Levinson explicitly endorses a version of type-creationism.
The claim that repeatable artworks are types which are created constitutes the bare-bones of a type-creationist treatment of repeatable artworks, a treatment that can be fleshed out in numerous ways. In the remainder of this section, I'll sketch my preferred way of filling in some of the details, and will develop the view to the extent required to answer the objections to type-creationism considered below. Let's call the individuals which allow for the generation of tokens the embodiments of a type.
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It is the existence of the embodiment of a type that enables the production of (further) tokens of the type. What's important for the existence of a type is, then, the possibility of generating tokens of that type: that is, that some embodiment of the type exists.
10
Now recipes are themselves subject to the type/token distinction. For example, there are distinct tokens of a given musical score, and distinct tokens of a set of recursions clauses.
As such, recipes themselves exist whenever there is a token of the recipe, a recipe for creating a token of the recipe, or when the recipe is stored. As a result there is an ambiguity in my formulation of the existence conditions of a type, T: is it the recipe type or token which is sufficient for the existence of T? If we have a recipe for a recipe for the production of tokens of T, then, in the relevant sense of 'possible', it is possibly possible to produce a 8 Individuals, 233. 9 The three types of embodiment listed above are not taken to be mutually exclusive or completely exhaustive. Some tokens, such as copies of novels, store types in a way that recitals, for example, do not, so the categories are not mutually exclusive. On the other hand, some embodiments, perhaps storyboards for comics, could be hybrids of tokens and recipes. 10 This is in fact too strong since we may have two overlapping partial embodiments, for instance, two partial copies of a novel, which would allow for the production of a new novel. But I set this aside in order to simplify the discussion.
token of T. The question is, though, is it possible to produce a token of T? More generally does the relevant notion of possibility obey S4: ◊◊P ⊃ ◊P? It seems clear that a piece of music survives if all that is left is someone's memory of a score, and so it cannot be that a token of a recipe is required for a recipe to sustain a musical work. So perhaps the existence of the recipe type is sufficient for T? In any case, as recipes and storage suffice for the existence of a type, T, the existence of a token of T is not, in general, required for the existence of T, and so the destruction of all of a type's tokens is not sufficient for the destruction of the type.
All of the above kinds of token generation allow for the imperfect (re)production of tokens and, relatedly, for modifications of a type. So, for example, how we write and say a word can change over time and imperfect copies of a work are still be copies of that work. Moreover, it seems that deviation from past tokens and recipes in the production of tokens can be deliberate, as authors and composers can, it seems, rewrite their own works, by producing tokens or recipes that differ from previous tokens/recipes with respect to their internal properties. What this shows is that tokens need not be alike in their internal properties to be (imperfect) tokens of the same type, as, for instance, a token and an imperfect copy of it may be tokens (albeit imperfect in at least one case) of the same type. So although (first-order) pure universals are fixed by relations of qualitative resemblance among objects -the universal's instances -(first-order) created types are impure universals tracing historical chains of (re)production.
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If that's correct, created types are individuated by features that are, in some sense, external to them. We have seen that qualitative resemblance amongst tokens is not necessary for them to be tokens of the same type. Further, if types trace historical chains of production, then the qualitative identity tokens does not ensure that they are tokens of the same type since they may result from different historical chains. Relatedly, there can be multiple types that do not differ with respect to their internal properties. To see this consider two types/tokens which are created completely separately and which, although resembling one another somewhat, we would unhesitatingly say are distinct artworks. Since these types can be modified over time by modifying tokens or by producing tokens which differ from their predecessors, then the two types and their tokens can come to converge in their qualitative properties. But there are two types here, since if x is distinct from y at one time, it is distinct from y at all times that they exist.
This picture of repeated artworks as created types has, I think, great intuitive appeal as it allows us to capture the repeatability, creativity, and evolution that we ordinarily associate with artworks such as novels and pieces of music. Despite this, it has been rejected on the basis of certain general claims about abstract objects. Below ( §3- §5) I consider and reject three such objections, arguing that they all rely on overgeneralizations concerning abstract objects. But first I show why such objections require argument.
Objections from Abstractness
The three objections to type-creationism about repeatable artworks considered below all have the following form:
(1) If type-creationism is true, there are repeatable artworks which are abstract objects (of a particular sort) which have feature F.
(2) No abstract object (of this sort) has feature F.
Therefore,
Type-creationism about repeatable artworks is false.
In particular, they all propose a premise of the form of (2), and in particular, the following claims:
(4) No abstract object has accidental intrinsic properties.
(5) No abstract object can be created because no abstract object can stand in causal relations.
(6) No type can be created because types exist at all times. Now abstract objects are often taken to be non-spatial, non temporal, non-causal, immutable and unchanging, eternal, and necessary. It might be thought then, that (4) to (6) are obviously true, and so type-creationism is a non-starter. Let us say that an object that has some balance of features from the list above is ABSTRACT. Now if we choose our features carefully, (4) to (6) will be true, if all abstract objects (in the case of (4) and (5)) and all types (in the case of (6) So, unless some compelling argument is offered for the claim that repeatable artworks are ABSTRACT, nothing follows for the metaphysics of such artworks from the observation that ABSTRACT objects have certain features. We now turn to three attempts to show that types are not suitable abstract objects with which to identify repeatable artworks.
Abstract Objects have their Intrinsic Properties Essentially
Hazlett offers the following argument against the existence of repeatable artworks:
(7) If there are repeatable artworks, they are abstract objects.
(8) All repeatable artworks have accidental intrinsic properties.
(9) No abstract object has any accidental intrinsic properties.
Therefore, 12 Fiction and Metaphysics, xii.
(10) There are no repeatable artworks.
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Type-creationism is obviously committed to (7) and the version above also makes room for 14 The key to Hazlett's argument, then, is (9). As we noted above, nothing follows for created types from the fact that no ABSTRACT entities has accidental intrinsic properties. Indeed, even if there were some other type of entity, E, which shared a whole range of features with created types, it would not follow from Es having their intrinsic properties essentially, that created types have their intrinsic properties essentially. Moreover, it seems obvious that repeatable artworks are both abstract and do have accidental intrinsic properties, so (9) seems false.
Hazlett, however, advances an argument for (9). The starting point of Hazlett's argument is his claim that the existence of (pure) abstract objects makes no demands on the world: there is nothing the world must be like for it to be the case that the number 2 exists. (11) Abstract objects make no demands on the world (in Yablo's sense) (12) If an object makes no demands on the world, then it has no accidental intrinsic properties Therefore (13) Abstract objects have no accidental intrinsic properties.
Hazlett supports (12) as follows:
suppose that x has some accidental intrinsic property F. In some worlds
x is F, and in others x isn't F ... But if x is like that, then it becomes impossible to see how the existence of x could 'make no demands on the world,' ... What we cannot make sense of is the idea that the existence of the number 2 makes no demands on the world, whilst the number 2 undergoes intrinsic changes as a result of changes in the world.
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Now Hazlett's argument might be sound if we limit it to necessarily existing abstracta, since it is plausible that they make no demands on the world. But it isn't the case that contingent abstract objects, such as {Eiffel Tower}, make no demands on the world. For '{Eiffel Tower} has one member' to be true, the Eiffel Tower has to exist, and so {Eiffel Tower} does make demands on the world in Yablo' sense, hence (11) (14) is (15) If an (abstract) object makes no demands on the world which is not made by some associated concrete objects, then it has no accidental intrinsic properties.
But it is hard to see how to adopt Hazlett's argument for (12) in the passage above as an argument for (15). If x is F in one world and ~F in another, then x makes a demand on the world which is not made by some associated concrete objects, unless these associated concrete objects themselves differ between the two worlds. That is, if the variation in the intrinsic properties of an abstract object are mirrored by some appropriate variation in the associated concrete objects, then we can hold on to (14). To put all this another way, it is a philosophical commonplace that the arrangement of supervenient properties can vary as long as their supervenience base varies. Given this, there is no barrier to claiming that abstract objects have accidental intrinsic properties as long as the properties' supervenience base is contingently configured too.
What does the type-creationist take to be the supervenience base for repeatable artworks?
The creative acts of artists are obviously part of it, but also relevant are the type's embodiments, including the patterns of (re)production and modification. But given that these creative acts and the configuration of embodiments are contingent, the intrinsic properties of types can also be contingent. This is just to say that the truth of statements concerning the intrinsic properties of created types depends on the truth of statements concerning its embodiments and artists, but not on the truth of statements about other concrete objects.
And this is consistent with (14).
Of course, not all abstract objects which have a contingently configured supervenience base, such as {Eiffel Tower}, have accidental intrinsic properties. But from this it does not follow that no contingently existing abstracta have accidental intrinsic properties. The intrinsic properties of a type, unlike the intrinsic properties of a set, are sensitive to the properties of its supervenience base, and so there can be variation in the intrinsic properties of types,
given the possibility of variation in its supervenience base. It is in this way that repeatable artworks differ from sets. What Hazlett would have to do to reinstate his argument is to show that the intrinsic properties of created types are not sensitive in this way to variation in their supervenience base. But this he cannot do.
So Hazlett's argument for the modal inflexibility of intrinsic properties does not work for created types. And this is not a surprise as (15) does not seem compelling: we knew all along that entities whose intrinsic properties supervene on the properties of other entities can have accidental intrinsic properties: simply take any macroscopic concrete object or mental life. Hazlett's argument fails because he implicitly assumes that the intrinsic properties of an abstract object are insensitive to the properties of its supervenience base, as is the case for sets. But this generalization will not be granted by the type-creationist.
Hazlett, then, is guilty of making the kind of overgeneralizing move that we noted in §2 is illegitimate.
Abstract Objects are Causally Inert
The second and third challenges to type-creationism claim that abstract objects cannot be created. Consider the following 'paradox' presented by Ross Cameron. 19 The following three statements are inconsistent, and yet Cameron thinks they are all plausible:
(16) Musical works are created.
(17) Musical works are abstract objects. we ought to accept the resulting paraphrases at the expense of the face value claims involving abstracta, but I think we can see that the idea is in any case implausible.
In his work on mental causation, Yablo provides a criterion for assessing which of a range of putative causes is the best candidate to be the cause. 27 Yablo argues that in order to address the causal exclusion argument against non-physical causes, we must make use of the independently plausible claim that causes are proportional to their effects. I show below that when we apply this principle to causal statements involving repeatable artworks we see that it is repeatable artworks themselves, rather than any concrete surrogate, which are proportional to the target effect. So accepting Yablo's principle shows that, contra Dummett and Dodd, causal statements involving abstracta are sometimes better than causal statements not involving abstracta. There is, then, no reason to deny that abstract objects can stand in causal relations, and so the first argument for the claim that abstract objects are not created is to be rejected.
Yablo's idea is that a cause, C, must be proportional to its effect in the sense that it 'is enough for the effect without being too much'. 28 More carefully, let us follow Yablo and say that C is proportional to E iff it is both required and enough for E, where C is required for E iff none of its determinables screens it off from E, C is enough for E iff it screens off all of its determinates from E, and that C1 screens C2 off from E iff, had C1 occurred without C2, E would still have occurred.
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The notion of determinate and determinable that Yablo has in play here is a weak one, in that Y is a determinate of X =df Y necessitates X because X is immanent or included in Y. (19) Her driving through the radar caused her to be ticketed (20) Her speeding through the radar sober caused her to be ticketed.
In the imagined scenario, neither of (19) nor (20) are true since her driving through the radar was not enough to be ticketed, whilst 'her speeding through the radar sober was too much, since her sobriety had nothing to do with it'.
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Perhaps those who think that abstract objects cannot stand in causal relations can appeal to
Yablo's criterion of proportionality to support their claim? Unfortunately, proportionality supports the opposite conclusion, namely, that abstract objects can be part of the causal nexus. Consider the following: American Psycho, and so reading an Easton Ellis novel is not enough for our target effect.
That is, reading an Easton Ellis novel does not screen off one of its determinates, namely reading American Psycho. On the other hand, reading a particular copy, or indeed some copy or other, is not required to secure the effect, since he could have read the first three chapters of one copy and the remainder of another and the effect would still have occurred.
Moreover, it seems that if John reads some copy of American Psycho, there is some copy of
American Psycho that John reads. But John would have gone book shopping if he'd read
American Psycho without having read one of the actual copies, and so (22) heaven. The creation of a type is linked to the creation of certain concrete objects, namely its embodiments, and it is by creating these individuals that we create types, just as it is by creating the Eiffel Tower, that we bring about the existence of {Eiffel Tower}. And so the first challenge to the creation of types fails.
Types are Eternal Existents
Although Dodd now accepts that abstract objects can stand in causal relations, 33 he still thinks that types cannot be created. This is because he endorses the following argument:
(23) All types exist at all times (24) If a type exists at all times, it cannot be created. No one who did not already accept (31) would be moved by this argument. Either the existence of the object O is required for the existence of the property λx.x=O, or it is not. If it is required, then the claim that all properties exist at all times has nothing to recommend it. If it is not required, then (29) is false. Either way, the argument fails. Similarly, Dodd's argument is not compelling, since, although its premises may be individually plausible, as a package, they are not. Obviously Dodd would deny (29) and claim it is not analogous to (26).
But intuitively both (26) and (29) concern impure properties, and as a property, λz.Fz, is 34 Works of Music, Chapter 3.
impure only if ∃R∃y∀x(Px ≡ Rxy), both properties entail the existence of the associated entities, whether that be T or O. So anyone who denies that T or O exist at all times, will deny that impure properties exist at all times. Dodd's insistence that impure properties exist eternally means that we lose our grip on what impure properties are. Nevertheless, Dodd presents a defence of (27) so we must consider where Dodd's arguments go wrong.
First, Dodd offers a semantic argument for (27). One reason for positing properties is to serve as the semantic value of predicates. Dodd claims that the very same semantic considerations that prompt us to posit the existence of properties also prompt us to suppose that these properties exist before it was possible for them to be instantiated.
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In particular, he claims that both true and false sentences of the form (32) 'a is F' 'commit us to the existence of the properties expressed by their predicates', in this case the property of being F, λx.Fx.
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Now presumably, what holds for properties, holds for objects, so that both the truth and falsity of sentences like (32) commit us to the existence of a as well as to λx.Fx. 37 So, the falsity of 'Socrates is alive' commits us to the existence of Socrates. But there is clearly some sense in which 'Socrates exists' is false. That is, although Socrates used to exist, he no longer exists -he does not exist now. What the semantic consideration that Dodd points to shows, then, is that the truth or falsity of instances of (32) commit us to the existence of a and λx.Fx at some time or other. But what is at issue between the type-creationist and Dodd is at which times do properties and types exist. That we can refer to an entity at t does not establish that the entity exists at t, but only that it does, did, or will exist. So issues of reference do not establish (27).
There is a related consideration, however, that is not met by distinguishing between these notions of existence. Dodd denies that 'a property can be instantiated by an object at t and yet the property not exist at the time at which it is instantiated. 38 And what goes for properties, we may think holds of objects too, so that if Dodd is correct, an object cannot instantiate a property at t, if the object does not exist at t. These two theses naturally motivate The Temporal Existence Constraint: A present tense sentence 'a is F' is true at t only if a exists at t and λx.Fx exists at t.
Could Dodd use The Temporal Existence Constraint to argue for (27)? It is hard to see how.
First, Dodd would need to produce a true present tense sentence which ascribes a property of the form being a T, for some type T, which the type-creationist says does not now exist. The Weakened Principle of Instantiation: A property P exists at time t iff there is a time at which it is metaphysically possible for P to be instantiated.
The Principle of Instantiation: A property P exists at time t iff there is a time at which P is instantiated.
The Strengthened Principle of Instantiation: A property P exists at time t iff P is instantiated at t.
The first two principles entail Dodd's claim that all properties exist at all times, whereas The But (37) is inconsistent with, for instance, the conjunction of:
(38) Musical works are types.
(39) Musical scores are not tokens of musical work types.
(40) The existence of a musical score is sufficient for the existence of a musical work.
Given that (39) and (40) repeatable artworks. Given the productivity of language, we know that there are sentences that never have and never will be uttered or inscribed.
The principles concerning the existence of properties above were all couched in terms of a property's instances. But some properties, including being a T, have more complicated dependencies on the concrete world. What is important for the existence of such a property is not that there is an instance of it, or that there will at some time or other be an instance of it, or even that it is metaphysically possible that there be an instance of it, but rather that there is an embodiment of the corresponding type. In the presence of an embodiment of a type, there is a condition which something would have to meet to count as a token of that type, which is to say that the property of being a T exists. But given that the existence of a type's embodiments can vary temporally and modally, so too can the existence of the property of being a T. The arguments of this section against type-creationism are unsuccessful precisely because they fail to take into account the complex ways in which types and their associated properties are related to the concrete world, and in particular because they fail to take into account embodiments of types other than tokens.
Dodd, perhaps, would object that on this picture we countenance the intermittent existence of properties as embodiments of types go out of and come back in to existence. This is a possibility on his conception of types as individuated by internal properties, but it is not a possibility when types are not so individuated. On my conception of created types, once the conditions for the instantiation of the corresponding property, being a T, have gone out of existence, it cannot come back into existence given that such types trace historical paths.
For example, now that all of the embodiments of Love's Labour's Won have been destroyed, there will never be a copy of this work, even if someone were, coincidentally, to write a work word-for-word identical with it.
Conclusion
I have briefly sketched an intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types. This picture has been rejected by those who make sweeping claims about abstract objects in general, or else about types in particular. We have seen on examination, however, that these claims are false.
In their own ways, these arguments against type-creationism all make the same mistake.
They assume either that abstract objects float free of the concrete world, or are tethered to it in some particularly simplistic way. For instance, Dodd assumes that properties are either broadly Platonic, existing unaffected by the current goings on in the concrete realm, or else exist only when instantiated. But this is just to ignore the creationist message as set out by
Thomasson in §1. For the creationist, a type and the associated property of being a token of that type are dependent abstracta, which are tethered to the concrete world in the various ways described above. These ways include, but are not limited to, having tokens or being instantiated. As such, they do not fit into traditional ontological categories: types are neither Platonic eternal, unchanging entities, nor are they to be identified with concreta or constructions from them; and properties are not to be conceived as either Platonic or Aristotelian. Given the intuitiveness and the coherence of the picture sketched above, and the failure of the objections to the view considered here, we should pursue in more depth the idea that repeatable artworks are created types along the lines I have suggested. 
